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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-
making processes in a world where agents must be motivated to collect in-
formation. Committees improve the quality of decision-making by providing
information and by coordinating the collection of information. We address
two types of questions. First, how does the composition of a committee affect
final decisions? Second, what is the optimal composition of a committee from
the decision maker’s point of view? As to the latter question, we show that
the cost of information collection plays an important role. If this cost is low,
then the preferences of the committee members should be aligned to those of
the decision maker. Members with similar preferences as the decision maker
collect the proper pieces of information. Moreover, manipulation of informa-
tion does not occur if the preferences of the decision maker and the members
are consonant. If the cost of searching is high, then the committee should
be composed of members with polarized preferences. Outliers have a strong
incentive to search for information.
Key words: committees, information collection, preference outliers, mod-
erates.
JEL codes: D81, D83.
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1 Introduction
The consequences of many decisions are complicated and difficult to foresee. Of-
ten small groups - committees - assist decision makers with collecting information.
Committees are used in all types of organizations. In U.S. Congress committees
prepare and propose bills; in firms committees rather than single persons prepare
major investment decisions; in universities committees have much say in appoint-
ment decisions.
A common rationale for the existence of committees is that they lead to decisions
which are based on more and/or better information. However, it is also well-known
that committees may raise an agency problem. When the interests of committee
members on the one hand and the interests of the decision maker or organization on
the other hand do not perfectly align, committee members may have an incentive
to manipulate or conceal information.
We argue that apart from manipulation and concealment of information com-
mittees may raise two other agency problems. First, committee members may lack
incentives to collect information. Information is usually not for free. In most studies
on committees, it is assumed rather than explained that committees are informed.
Second, committee members must be motivated to collect the proper pieces of in-
formation. The reason for this agency problem is that the consequences of many
decisions are multi-dimensional. For instance, the construction of a new railroad has
economic consequences, consequences for the environment and social consequences.
A committee thus faces the problem of determining which pieces of information to
collect. Concerning this choice, the desires of the principal may deviate from those
of the committee members.
This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision mak-
ing processes in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information.
We analyze a simple model in which a decision maker has to make a binary deci-
sion under uncertainty. The decision maker misses three pieces of information. A
committee consisting of two members is tasked with the provision of information.
Each member can collect at most one piece of information. An important aspect of
our model is that the nature of the three pieces of information differs. One piece
of information is soft and can be manipulated if it is found. The other two pieces
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are hard information. If hard information is found, it can costlessly be verified.
Another important aspect of our model is that the decision maker cannot guide the
behavior of committee members through monetary rewards. The reason why in our
model committee members may collect and supply information is that they have
an interest in the outcomes. These interests may differ from those of the decision
maker. Our setting enables us to address two types of questions: First, how does
the composition of a committee affect final decisions? Second, what is the optimal
composition of a committee from the decision maker’s point of view?
As to the question of the optimal composition of the committee, we show that
the cost of information collection plays an important role. If this cost is low, then
the preferences of the committee members should be aligned to those of the decision
maker. The committee should be composed of members with polarized preferences
if the cost is high. The intuition behind this result is as follows. From the decision
maker’s point of view, there are two benefits of committee members with prefer-
ences similar to those of himself. First, recommendations based on soft information
are most informative when the preferences of the members and the principal are
consonant.1 Second, if the preferences of the committee members and the principal
are consonant, then the committee members will collect the pieces of information
the principal wants them to collect. The benefit of appointing preference outliers is
that preference outliers have stronger incentives to collect information. For example,
a member who is strongly biased against a project has strong incentives to search
for information that may convince the decision maker that the project should not
be implemented.2 If the cost of acquiring information is high, then members with
moderate preferences will not collect information. A related result is that if the
costs of collecting information is high, only hard information will be collected. The
reason is that preference outliers have incentives to manipulate soft information.
Manipulation precludes communication between the principal and the members.
Consequently, outliers do not collect soft information. Hard information cannot be
manipulated by definition.
We believe that our results improve our understanding of the role of commit-
1This result is well-known from the cheap talk literature. In the context of the literature on
committees, Krehbiel (1991) speaks about the outlier principle.
2Interest groups can be seen as preference outliers. Interest groups provide information through,
for example, lobbying, see among others Potters and van Winden (1992).
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tees in decision- making processes. On the basis of our results we can categorize
alternative types of committees. At one extreme, we have the advocacy committee.
An advocacy committee consists of a strong proponent and a fierce opponent of the
project. The former will try to find hard evidence supporting the project, while
the latter will try to find hard evidence against the project. As a rule, advocacy
committees do not speak with one voice. At the other extreme, we have the mod-
erate committee. The members of a moderate committee have preferences which
are approximately congruent with those of the principal. Transmission of soft infor-
mation between committee members and the decision maker is possible. Moderates
may also search for hard information. Unlike in advocacy committees, in moderate
committees there is not a natural division of tasks. Tasks have to be coordinated.
Both archetypes of committees, as well as mixed forms, can be found in orga-
nizations. Krehbiel (1990) finds that most legislative committees in U.S. Congress
consist of members with moderate preferences. He finds preference outliers in some
committees, however. We identify the conditions under which the various types of
committees are desirable from the point of view of the median floor member.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the literature
related to this paper. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents equilibria of
our game first under the assumption that information is hard, and next under the
assumption that information is soft. Section 5 examines what kind of information
is provided if members can decide to search for either hard or soft information. In
Section 6 we extend the basic model by allowing the principal to appoint committee
members. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper makes use of several elements employed in other papers. The collection
of information is delegated to committees.3 The principal retains the formal author-
ity to make the decision. However, by providing information committee members
essentially control the decision (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Taking this into account,
the principal wants to guide the actions of the committee members.
3See for an excellent overview of theories of delegation Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001).
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In our paper, we consider the collection of several pieces of information, veri-
fiable as well as non-verifiable. As far as the latter is concerned, communication
between the members and the principal plays an important role. Crawford and So-
bel (1982) show that perfect communication of non-verifiable information requires
that the preferences of the players are congruent. Using a model of soft information,
Krishna and Morgan (2001) study information transmission between a principal and
two perfectly and identically informed experts. They focus on the aggregation and
extraction of soft information rather than on the collection of information. In the
same spirit, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) examine how the order of speech affects
the extraction of information within committees. Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) show
that voting procedures may improve the extraction of information when committee
members have conflicting preferences.4
Dur and Swank (2002) study the selection of an advisor in a situation in which the
collection of information is costly. As in our paper, the collection of soft information
requires that the preferences of the advisor and the principal are congruent. An
unbiased advisor, however, has strong incentives to collect soft information since
information often affects his recommendation. Our paper focuses on the collection
of information through the use of committees. Committees may also facilitate the
coordination of information collection if the consequences of the decision are multi-
dimensional.
A paper closely related to ours is Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). They show
that using two competing agents defending their own special interest improves the
quality of decision-making compared to using a single information-collecting agent.
They thus provide a rationale for advocacy. Our paper deviates from the paper
by Dewatripont and Tirole in two respects. First, Dewatripont and Tirole assume
that agents are ideologically neutral and can be induced to search through monetary
decision-based rewards. We focus on situations in which committee members col-
lect information solely because they have a non-monetary interest in the outcomes.
Second, in Dewatripont and Tirole agents can only collect hard information, while
in our model agents may also collect soft information.
Furthermore, our paper is related to the literature on the composition of com-
4Piketty (1999) provides an overview of the information-aggregation literature.
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mittees in U.S. Congress. There are two strands in this literature. First, the in-
formational theory argues that preferences of committee members should be close
to the preferences of the median floor member.5 The principal (e.g. Congress) can
prevent manipulation of information by appointing members with moderate pref-
erences.6 Second, the distributive theory argues that committees are composed of
preference outliers.7 Committees are presumed to have strong proposal power and
agenda-setting control. This allows committee members to enforce bills that are
beneficial for a small group but are inefficient for the society as a whole. Each rep-
resentative then applies for a committee that potentially benefits his constituency
most. Hence, as claimed by Shepsle and Weingast (1987), committees consist of
”homogeneous high demanders”.
Empirical research shows that in most committees in U.S. Congress moderates
are found while sometimes preference outliers are found.8 Our paper provides the
conditions under which different types of committee members are optimal. As in
the informational theory, there is a clear incentive for the principal to use like-
minded committee members if the costs of searching are low. However, members
with moderate preferences have no incentive to collect information if the costs of
searching are high. Then it is optimal to make use of preference outliers.
3 The Model
3.1 Policies
A decision maker, for example the median voter of Congress, has to make a decision
about a project, X. There are two alternatives: implementation (X = 1) and status
quo (X = 0). The consequences of the project are surrounded by uncertainty. The
5See the papers by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990, 1997).
6In their 1990 paper, Gilligan and Krehbiel argue that preference outliers may have lower costs
of collecting information. This provides a rationale for using members with polarized preferences.
In our paper, the cost of searching is equal for all agents. However, biased agents have a stronger
interest in the decision to be made. Hence, rather than the costs the benefits of searching differ
among agents.
7The major references are Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and Weingast and Marshall (1988).
8See for example Krehbiel (1990). Groseclose (1992) provides an overview of the empirical
literature on the composition of committees in U.S. Congress.
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decision maker prefers X = 1 to X = 0 if
p+ θA + θB + µ > 0. (1)
The parameter θA is equal to −z with probability 12 and 0 with probability 12 . The
parameter θB equals z with probability 12 and 0 with probability
1
2
. The parameter
µ is uniformly distributed over the interval [−h, h]. The reason for the asymmetry
among the parameters is as follows. As we will see below, information about µ cannot
be verified (it captures soft information). Communication about µ occurs through
recommendations. By assuming that µ is distributed according to a continuous
function, we allow for the possibility of imperfect communication. Information about
θA and θB cannot be manipulated by assumption (it captures hard information).
We assume for simplicity that both are binary parameters. The three parameters
are independently distributed. The parameter p denotes the expected benefit of
the project from the decision maker’s point of view. It is meant to capture the
decision maker’s political attitude towards the project. We assume that p < 0.9
The implication is that without information about the stochastic terms the decision
maker would choose X = 0.
3.2 Information Collection
The decision maker constitutes a committee of two agents to learn the consequences
of the project. Each agent can learn the value of at most one stochastic term.
Formally, agent i, i ∈ {1, 2}, selects Li ∈ {θA, θB, µ, 0}, where Li = 0 denotes that
agent i chooses to learn nothing. To learn the value of a stochastic term, an agent
must incur disutility of effort K. When agent i selects Li = θA or Li = θB, he learns
its value with certainty. We assume that θA and θB contain hard information, in
the sense that if agent i finds that θA = −z or θB = z, he can credibly communicate
this information to anybody. Discovering θA = −z can be interpreted as finding
an argument for maintaining the status quo. Likewise, discovering θB = z can be
interpreted as finding an argument for implementation. Though information about
θA and θB cannot be forged, it can be concealed.
9The analysis of the case that p > 0 is analogous to the case analyzed below.
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When agent i selects Li = µ and incurs K, he receives a private signal si about
µ with probability π and learns nothing with probability 1 − π. The signal si is
fully informative: si = µ. For simplicity, we assume that whether or not an agent
has received a signal is common knowledge.10 However, the content of the signal is
only known to the agent. The signal contains soft information, that is information
that cannot be verified. If the agent has received a signal about µ, then he makes a
recommendation about the project. We allow for two recommendations: Yi (agent
i recommends X = 1) and Ni (agent i recommends X = 0). Formally, the message
space of agent i is mi ∈ {0,−z, z, Yi, Ni}.
3.3 The Committee
Like the decision maker, the agents are concerned with policy outcomes. Agent i
prefers X = 1 to X = 0 if
ai + θA + θB + µ > 0, (2)
where ai ∈ (−∞,∞) denotes agent i’s political attitude towards the project. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that a2 ≥ a1. As to the nature of the ai’s, we make
two alternating assumptions. In the next two sections, the ai’s are exogenous. In
Section 6, the decision maker appoints members of the committee. We model this
by allowing the decision maker to determine the political attitude of each agent.
Throughout, we assume that agents’ decisions are voluntary. They cannot be forced
to collect information. Nor can they be forced to collect information about a specific
stochastic term.
3.4 The Timing
First, nature chooses θA, θB and µ. Next, the decision maker appoints two agents: a1
and a2. Once appointed, each agent decides whether or not to examine an aspect of
the project or to do nothing Li ∈ {θA, θB, µ, 0}. The two agents examine the project
simultaneously.11 When the process of information collection has been completed,
10This assumption does not affect the results qualitatively.
11This assumption is not innocuous. For example, in our model we allow for the possibility that
L1 = L2 = µ. If there were no time constraint, it would be always better to let agent i to examine
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communication may take place between the agents on the one hand and the decision
maker on the other hand. If found, hard information may be transmitted. In
addition, agents who have received a signal about µ may make a recommendation.
We assume that if agent i looks for hard information while agent j looks for soft
information, agent j speaks after agent i.12 Finally, the decision maker chooses
X = 1 or X = 0.
We have a game with asymmetric information. To solve the game we identify
equilibria in which (1) players’ strategies are optimal responses to each other given
the players’ beliefs about the stochastic terms, and (2) given this set of strategies,
the beliefs about the stochastic terms are updated according to Bayes’ Rule.
For reasons of brevity, we confine ourselves to analyzing two equilibria of the
game. First, we identify the conditions under which a committee searches only for
hard information. Second, we identify the conditions under which a committee only
searches for soft information. We are aware of the existence of other equilibria.
Appendix A discusses one of them. We believe that analyzing the conditions of the
existence for the two prototypes suffices for understanding the main mechanism at
work. The results of Appendix A confirm this belief.
4 Hard and soft information
This section consists of two parts. In the first part we examine the model of Section
3 under the assumption that h = 0. Thus each agent looks for hard information or
does not look for information, Li ∈ {θA, θB, 0}. In the second part, we assume that
z = 0, so that the model revolves around soft information.
4.1 Hard Information (h = 0)
The following Proposition identifies the conditions for an equilibrium in which both
pieces of hard information are collected.
µ first, and to let agent j to select Lj conditional on the findings of agent i.
12This assumption seems plausible. As it turns out later, a recommendation may depend on the
realization of θA or θB. As a consequence, an agent may change his recommendation when new
information becomes available. This assumption makes this possible. It should be emphasized that
this assumption does not affect our results qualitatively.
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Proposition 1 Suppose p > −z, a1 ≤ −4K and a2 > 4K−z. Then an equilibrium
exists in which the strategies are defined as follows: (i) agent 1 examines θA and
reports information, if found; (ii) agent 2 examines θB and reports information, if
found; (iii) the DM chooses X = 1 if and only if he learns θB = z and infers that
θA = 0. The posterior probabilities are given by Pr(θA = 0 |no report θA = −z) = 1
and Pr(θB = 0 |no report θB = z) = 1.
Proof. To prove Proposition 1, we have to show that no player has an incentive
to deviate from his strategy, and that priors are updated according to Bayes’ Rule.
The proof consists of four steps.
1. If θA = −z (θB = z) , then agent 1 (2) reports this to the DM. Consequently,
the DM can infer that θA = 0 (θB = 0) if agent 1 (2) does not report evidence.
2. When the DM makes his decision about X, he has learned or has inferred the
values of θA and θB. Since −z < p < 0, X = 1 yields a higher payoff than
X = 0 if and only if θA = 0 and θB = z.
3. Consider agent 1’s strategy. Reporting θA = −z induces the DM to choose
X = 0. Not reporting θA = −z induces the DM to choose X = 1 if θB = z.
Reporting thus yields a higher payoff than not reporting if a1 < 0. It is easy to
verify that in equilibrium, the expected payoff to agent 1 equals 1
4
(a1 + z)−K.
If L1 = 0 agent 1 would not incur K and, obviously, would never report
evidence. His expected payoff would become 1
2
¡
a1 +
1
2
z
¢
. Agent 1 thus selects
L1 = θA if a1 ≤ −4K. Note that if this restriction is satisfied, then agent 1
reports evidence, if found.
4. Now consider agent 2’s strategy. Reporting θB = z induces the DM to choose
X = 1 if θA = 0. Not reporting θB = z induces the DM to choose X =
0. Reporting thus yields a higher payoff than not reporting if a2 > −z. It
is easy to verify that in equilibrium, the expected payoff to agent 2 equals
1
4
(a2 + z) − K. If L2 = 0 agent 2 would not incur K and, obviously, would
never report evidence. His expected payoff would be equal to zero. Agent 2
thus selects L2 = θB if a2 > 4K − z. Note that if this restriction is satisfied,
then agent 2 reports evidence, if found.
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Proposition 1 shows the conditions under which both pieces of hard information
are collected. A necessary condition for committee members to collect information
is that the principal responds to information. This requires that the principal is not
too strongly opposed towards implementation, p > −z.
The second condition states that agent 1 has an incentive to search for the disad-
vantages of the project if he is sufficiently biased against the project. To understand
why, first recall that the DM implements the project only if an argument in fa-
vor and no argument against the project is found. Consequently, finding evidence
against the project only affects the decision if an argument in favor of the project
is found. A committee member who is biased towards implementation is in favor of
implementation if an argument in favor of the project is found. Hence, searching for
arguments against the project requires a bias against the project. The agent has to
be sufficiently biased, because investigation is costly.
The third condition shows that agent 2 has an incentive to search for the ad-
vantages of the project if he is sufficiently biased towards the project. However,
if the costs are low then agent 2 may also have an incentive to select L2 = θB if
he is slightly opposed towards the project. The reason is simple. Suppose K = 0.
Finding an argument in favor of the project convinces the DM to select X = 1 only
if no argument against the project is found. An agent opposed to implementation
also prefers X = 1 if an argument in favor is found an no argument against is found.
Hence, without costs of searching also agents biased against the project want to
search for the advantages of the project. For high costs of searching, the benefits
of searching exceed the costs of searching only for agents who are biased towards
implementation.
There is thus a natural division of tasks if the committee is composed of a strong
opponent and a strong proponent of the project.13 The former tries to find evidence
against the project, while the latter tries to find evidence in favor of the project.
Communication between the members to divide tasks is not necessary. Note that
members with moderate preferences do not collect hard information if the costs of
searching are high. Moderates do have an incentive to collect hard information if
13Krehbiel (1990) calls these agents ”bipolar outliers”, on each side of the political spectrum
there is an outlier.
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the costs of searching are low. Coordination of tasks is necessary, however, when
the committee is composed of two members with moderate preferences.
4.2 Soft Information (z = 0)
Now the model revolves around soft information. The following proposition shows
the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which both agents collect soft
information.14
Proposition 2 Suppose ai ∈ [−h, h], p ∈ (12 (a2 − h) , 0), p ≤ 12 (a1 + a2), 14hπ (1− π)
(h+ a1)
2 + 1
4h
π2 (a2 − a1)2 ≥ K and 14hπ (1− π) (h+ a2)2 ≥ K . Then, an equilib-
rium exists in which the strategies are: (i) agent i examines µ; he sends mi = 0
if he has not received a signal; he sends mi = Yi if he has found si > −ai; he
sends mi = Ni if he has found si ≤ −ai; (ii) the DM chooses X = 1 if he has
received (Y1, Y2), (Y1, 0), (0, Y2), and chooses X = 0 otherwise. The posterior be-
liefs are given by: E(µ | Y1, Y2) = E (µ | Y1, 0) = 12(h − a1); E(µ | N1,N2) =
E (µ | 0, N2) = −12(h+ a2); E (µ | N1, Y2) = −12 (a1 + a2); E(µ | 0, Y2) = 12(h− a2);
E(µ | N1, 0) = −12(h+ a1) and E (µ | 0, 0) = 0.
Proof. To prove Proposition 2, we have to show that no player has an incentive
to deviate from his strategy, and that priors are updated according to Bayes’ Rule.
The proof consists of four steps.
1. The posterior beliefs directly follow from the agents’ strategies and the as-
sumption that a2 ≥ a1.
2. Consider agent 1’s strategy. The DM’s strategy implies that if agent 1 has
received a signal, agent 1’s recommendation is decisive: Y1 (N1) implies X = 1
(X = 0). Since agent 1 prefers X = 1 to X = 0 if µ > −a1, he sends Y1 if
s1 > −a1 and N1 if s1 ≤ −a1. Agent 1 selects L1 = µ, if L1 = µ yields a
14An equilibrium in which one agent collects soft information while the other agent refrains from
searching may exist. This equilibrium, however, requires coordination. In addition, there exists
an equilibrium in which the DM ignores all recommendations and neither of the agents examine
µ. In this equilibrium, posterior beliefs are equal to the prior beliefs.
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higher expected payoff than L1 = 0:
π
·
h+ a1
2h
¸ ·
a1 +
1
2
(h− a1)
¸
+ (1− π)π
·
h+ a2
2h
¸ ·
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¸
−K
≥ π
·
h+ a2
2h
¸ ·
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¸
,
implying 1
4h
π (1− π) (h+ a1)2 + 14hπ2 (a2 − a1)2 ≥ K.
3. Consider agent 2’s strategy. The DM’s strategy implies that agent 2’s message
is only decisive if agent 1 has not received a signal. Agent 2 prefers X = 1
to X = 0 if µ > −a2. Since the DM may follow his recommendation, it
is optimal for agent 2 to send Y2 if s2 > −a2 and N2 if s2 ≤ −a2. It is
easy to verify that L2 = µ yields a higher expected payoff than L2 = 0 if
(1− π) π 1
4h
(h+ a2)
2 ≥ K.
4. Using the posterior beliefs, it is easy to verify that, given p ∈ (1
2
(a2 − h) , 0)
and p ≤ 1
2
(a1 + a2), the DM prefersX = 1 toX = 0 if he has received (Y1, Y2),
(Y1, 0), (0, Y2), and prefers X = 0 to X = 1 otherwise.
To understand Proposition 2 let us explain the conditions in it in detail. The
condition p ∈ (1
2
(a2 − h) , 0) shows the combination of parameters for which the DM
has an incentive to follow a recommendation for X = 1 made by agent 2. We refer to
this condition as the condition for communication. If a2 ≥ 2p+h then this condition
is violated. The reason is that if a2 deviates from p, then agent 2’s recommendation
does not accord with the DM’s interest for a range of µ. By following agent 2’s
recommendation, the DM runs the risk of making a wrong decision. If a2 is too
large, then the probability of making a wrong decision is so large that the DM prefers
not to follow the recommendation. Notice that the condition for communication is
always satisfied if a2 = p, as h > |p|. If a2 = p, then agent 2’s recommendation
is always in line with the DM’s interest. If the DM follows the recommendation
made by agent 2, he will certainly follow the recommendation made by agent 1.
The inequality p < 0 implies that the DM has to be convinced to choose X = 1.
Since a2 ≥ a1, agent 1 is less inclined than agent 2 to recommend implementation.
Hence, if the DM chooses X = 1 in case the message set is (0, Y2), then the DM also
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selects X = 1 in case the message set is (Y1, 0) or (Y1, Y2).
It is easy to verify that the condition p ≤ 1
2
(a1 + a2) implies that if the DM
observes the message set (N1, Y2), he prefers X = 0 to X = 1. As discussed above,
the more the preferences of the DM and an information provider deviate, the higher
is the probability that by following the recommendation the DM makes a wrong
decision. For this reason, in case two agents make conflicting recommendations, the
DM will follow the agent whose preferences are closest to his own preferences.
Finally, consider the last two conditions in Proposition 2. These conditions give
the incentive constraint to examine µ for agent 1 and agent 2, respectively. Three
features of these constraints are worth emphasizing. First, the higher is h, the
less restrictive are the incentive constraints. Of course, the reason is that more
uncertainty, that is an increase in h, increases the value of information. Second,
the higher is ai, the less restrictive are the incentive constraints. Agents who are
more biased towards the project have an stronger incentive to collect information to
convince the DM to implement the project. Recall, however, that soft information
is only provided if the condition for communication is satisfied. This requires that
the committee is composed of moderates. As a result, there exists no equilibrium in
which soft information is provided if the costs of searching are high.15 The reason
is as follows. On the one hand, a committee composed of preference outliers does
not collect soft information since they can not communicate with the DM.16 On
the other hand, although moderates can communicate with the DM, they are not
sufficiently interested in the outcome to incur a high cost. Third, the benefits of
examining µ depend on the value of π. Proposition 2 shows under what conditions
both agents examine µ. Clearly, duplication of effort only makes sense if the chances
of success are not too high. In case π = 1, an equilibrium in which both agents
always examine µ does not exist.17 One solution to this problem is a committee of
one agent. Alternatively, the agents could agree that only one of them examine µ.
The latter solution requires coordination.
15Formally, if K ≥ π (1− π)
h
(p+h)2
h
i
, then agents satisfying the condition for communication
have no incentive to search for soft information.
16In contrast, as seen section 4.1, preference outliers are willing to incur a high costs to collect
hard information. The reason is that communication is not required for collecting hard information.
17If π
h
(h+a1)
2
4h
i
≥ K, then also an equilibrium in which both agents select Li = 0 with probability
one does not exist. Without coordination, then only an equilibrium in mixed strategies may exist.
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5 Who Collects What?
In this section, we relax the assumption that either h = 0 or z = 0. This extension
increases the action space of each agent. Obviously, it also increases the number
of equilibria of the game. However, as in the previous section, we do not identify
all equilibria but restrict attention to two equilibria: The equilibrium in which each
agent collects hard information, and the equilibrium in which each agent collects
soft information.18
5.1 Hard information
This subsection examines under what circumstances an equilibrium can occur in
which agent 1 selects L1 = θA and agent 2 selects L2 = θB. To this end, we
identify the conditions under which neither agent has an incentive to deviate from
his strategy given the other agent’s strategy and the posterior beliefs. Proposition
1 gives the conditions for the same equilibrium when h = 0. Therefore, if the
conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, then neither agent 1 nor agent 2 has an
incentive to select Li = 0. As this section allows for the possibility that an agent
collects soft information, there remains to show under what conditions neither agent
has an incentive to select Li = µ.
In subsection 4.2, we have argued that an agent is only willing to collect soft
information if communication is possible. Of course, this is also the case in the
present model. The implication is that if the conditions for communication are
violated, then neither agent will deviate from his strategy by collecting soft infor-
mation. Lemma 1 gives the conditions under which no communication about µ is
possible when one agent collects hard information and the other agent deviates by
collecting soft information.
Lemma 1 Suppose agent i has selected Li = θA (Li = θB), agent j has selected
Lj = µ, aj ∈
£−h− 1
2
z, h+ 1
2
z
¤
, h > 1
2
z, and agent j has received a signal. Then
1. in case mi = −z (mi = 0), then the DM ignores the recommendation of agent
j if p /∈ (1
2
(aj − h) + 14z, 0).
18Appendix A discusses an equilibrium of the game in which one agent collects hard information
and one agent collects soft information.
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2. in case mi = 0 (mi = z), then the DM ignores the recommendation of agent j
if p /∈ (1
2
(aj − h)− 14z, 12(aj + h)− 14z].
Proof. The proofs of this lemma and the propositions in this section can be
found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that the conditions for communication depend on whether or
not hard evidence has been found. In case hard evidence has been found against
implementation (or no evidence has been found in favor of implementation) the
condition for communication is more restrictive than when both agents collect soft
information (see Proposition 2). In case hard evidence has been found in favor of
implementation (or no evidence has been found against implementation) the condi-
tion for communication becomes less restrictive than in Section 4.2. To understand
these results first recall that the reason why the DMmay follow advice is that advice
may reduce the risk of making a wrong decision. The probability that, without ad-
vice, the DM makes a wrong decision depends on his predisposition (p). The higher
is the absolute value of p, the lower is the probability that information about the
stochastic terms affects his decision. For example, when the DM is strongly opposed
against the project, it is unlikely that information about µ should affect his decision.
The effect of hard information on the benefits of advice is similar to the effect of
a change in the DM’s predisposition. Hard evidence against implementation makes
the DM more biased against the project (recall p < 0). A direct implication is
that the benefits of soft information reduce. Hard evidence in favor of the project
decreases the DM’s bias against the project. Consequently, the probability that
soft information affects the decision about the project rises. Hence, hard evidence
against the project reduces the benefits of advice, whereas hard evidence in favor of
the project increases the benefits of advice.
On the basis of Lemma 2 three situations can be distinguished. First, if both
conditions hold, then neither agent can affect the DM’s decision about the project
by making a recommendation on the basis of µ. Then, together Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1 give the conditions for an equilibrium in which both agents collect hard
information. Loosely speaking, these conditions say that if a committee consists of
outliers (with opposite preferences), so that communication about µ is not possible,
then the two members of a committee will collect hard information. Secondly, if one
of the two conditions is violated, then whether or not the DM follows an agent’s
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recommendation depends on whether or not the other agent presents hard evidence.
In this situation, an agent may prefer collecting soft information to collecting hard
information. Finally, if both conditions in Lemma 2 are violated, then the DM will
follow an agent’s recommendation about the project irrespective of the evidence
presented by the other agent. Clearly, the incentive to collect soft information is
stronger in the third situation than in the second situation. Proposition 3 gives
the conditions under which each agent prefers collecting hard information to soft
information in the third situation.19
Proposition 3 Suppose that the conditions presented in Proposition 1 hold and that
both conditions in Lemma 1 are violated. Suppose furthermore that:
i) (a1 + z) ≥ πh
£
(h+ a1)
2 + 1
4
z2
¤
+ 2(1− π)(a1 + 12z) and
ii) (a2 + z) ≥ πh
£
(h+ a2)
2 + 1
4
z2
¤
.
Then an equilibrium exists in which the strategies and the posterior probabilities
are as described in Proposition 1.
It is easy to verify that the constraints presented in the above Proposition become
more restrictive if h increases. Furthermore, provided that h > 1
4
, the constraints be-
come less restrictive, if z increases.20 The intuition is straightforward. If h increases,
the value of soft information increases. Consequently, a rise in h leads to stronger
incentives to collect soft information. Likewise, an increase in z leads usually to
stronger incentives to collect hard information.
5.2 Soft information
Proposition 2 shows under what conditions an equilibrium exists in which each agent
collects soft information when z = 0. When z > 0, it is no longer obvious that an
agent prefers collecting soft information to collecting hard information. Therefore,
there remains to show under what conditions each agent has no incentive to collect
19The conditions for an equilibrium in which each agent collects hard information are weaker in
the second situation (see Appendix B).
20To understand why an increase in z weakens the incentive to collect soft information only if
h is sufficiently large, recall that the value of soft information depends on the availability of hard
evidence (see Lemma 1).
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hard information, given that he prefers collecting soft information to collecting no
information. As in Subsection 5.1, deviating may imply a situation where one agent
collects hard information and one agent collects soft information. We have already
argued that in such a situation the possibility of communication about µ depends
on the availability of hard information.21 Here we focus on the case that hard
information does not affect the possibility of communication. This is implied by
condition i) in Proposition 4.22
Proposition 4 Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Suppose further-
more that:
i) p ∈ (1
2
(a2 − h) + 14z,−12z],
ii) (1− π) (h+ a1)2 + π (a2 − a1)2 ≥ 12z
¡
a2 − a1 + 14z
¢
, and
iii) (1− π) (h+ a2)2 ≥ 12z
¡
a2 − a1 + 14z
¢
.
Then an equilibrium exists in which the strategies and the posterior probabilities
are as described in Proposition 2.
From Section 4 we know that communication requires that the agents’ predispo-
sitions towards the project do not deviate too much from the DM’s predisposition.
This is a necessary condition for an equilibrium in which both agents select Li = µ.
In addition, agents must prefer collecting soft information to collecting hard infor-
mation. In Proposition 4, these conditions are given by ii) and iii). It is easy to
show that both conditions become more restrictive if z increases and/or h decreases.
Hence, an equilibrium in which each agent collects soft information is more likely to
occur when h is large and z is small. The intuition behind this result is as in the
previous subsection. The value of soft information increases with h, while the value
of hard information increases with z.
21Of course there is one difference. In this subsection, point of departure is a situation where
both agents collect soft information. When one agent deviates by searching for hard evidence, but
does not find evidence, the DM will believe that the agent has tried to find soft information. In
the previous subsection, point of departure was a situation where agents collect hard information.
22Thus, as in Subsection 5.1 several cases can be distinguished, depending on the possibility of
communication and the effect of hard information on the decision about the project. The main text
discusses the case that communication is possible whether or not hard evidence has been found. In
addition, when no recommendation is made, hard information does not affect the decision about
the project. See Appendix C for a description of all cases.
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One can also verify that the conditions in Proposition 4 become more restrictive if
a1 and a2 diverge. To understand why, suppose that agent 1 collects soft information.
If a2 > a1, then agent 1 recommends X = 0 too often from agent’s 2 point of
view. From Lemma 1 we know that agent 2 can influence agent 1’s recommendation
by providing hard evidence. Hard evidence in favor of the project increases the
probability that agent 1 recommends X = 1. Hence, by searching for the advantages
of the project agent 2 may affect agent 1’s recommendation in a favorable way.
6 Explaining the Composition of Committees
So far, we have analyzed how the composition of a committee affects the decision
whether or not to collect information, and the decision which pieces of information
to collect. In this section, we grant the DM with the power to appoint the committee
members. More formally, we allow the DM to determine ai ∈ (−∞,∞). We intend
to shed light on the empirical literature on the composition of committees in U.S.
Congress. In particular, Krehbiel (1990) finds that most committees are composed
of members alike the median floor member (moderates). Only occasionally, com-
mittee members are outliers. In this section, we try to identify the conditions under
which the two alternative types of committees exist. We will argue that the cost of
collecting information plays an essential role.
When appointing committee members, the DM anticipates their behavior. The
previous section describes this behavior. Loosely speaking, the results of Section 5
give the DM’s opportunity set. To examine who the DM will appoint, it is worth
to recall one result of Section 4 and two results of Section 5. First, in Section 4
we have shown that when K is sufficiently high, only agents who are sufficiently
biased towards or against the project are willing to incur the cost of collecting
information. We have argued that the implication of this result is that a very
high cost of collecting information excludes the possibility that soft information is
collected. Second, when z is large, and h and K are small, moderate committee
members collect soft information. Finally, when h is large, and z and K are small,
moderate committee members collect hard information.
From these results it is only a small step towards the determination of the DM’s
appointment decision. Recall that not all pieces of information can be collected.
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When a = p, the committee member and the DM will agree on which pieces of infor-
mation should be collected. In our model, the main difference between a committee
member and the DM is that a member incurs the cost of information collection,
while the DM does not. Hence, if the cost of information collection is low, then the
DM will appoint members who have the same preferences as himself. The following
Proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 5 Suppose i) K < 1
8
z, ii) p ∈ (4K−z,−4K], and iii)K ≤ 1
4h
π (1− π) (h+ p)2.
Then, ai = p yields at least the same payoff to the DM as ai 6= p.
Proof. The proofs of the propositions in this section can be found in the ap-
pendix.
The conditions in Proposition 5 ensure that two committee members with ai = p
would be willing to incur the cost of collecting both pieces of hard information
(condition i and ii) or would be willing to incur the cost of collecting soft information
twice (condition iii). When z is large relative to h, each committee member, like
the DM, prefers collecting hard information to collecting soft information. In this
case, the DM only weakly prefers ai = p to ai 6= p. Weakly, because a committee
with (opposite) outliers would yield the same outcomes. When h is large relative
to z, each committee member, like the DM, prefers collecting soft information to
collecting hard information. In this case, the DM strictly prefers ai = p to ai 6= p.
Strictly, because in case of soft information, ai 6= p distorts communication.
Now suppose the cost of collecting information is that high that a committee
member with ai = p is neither willing to collect hard information nor willing to
collect soft information. The DM is thus forced to appoint outliers. In Section 4 we
have argued that preference outliers have an incentive to manipulate information.
As a consequence, the collection of soft information becomes less attractive from
the DM’s point of view. Of course, when h is very large relative to z, the DM
may prefer the collection of soft information to the collection of hard information in
spite of the danger of manipulation of information. In this case, the DM appoints
committee members whose preferences are exactly extreme enough to induce them
to collect soft information. In case z is large relative to h, andK is high, the DM will
appoint preference outliers. Since outliers are willing to incur high cost of collecting
information, the DM will get the information he wants. Proposition 6 summarizes
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the above discussion about the case in which the cost of information collection is
high.
Proposition 6 Suppose K ≥ 1
8
z, and K > 1
4h
π (1− π) (h+ p)2. Then
i) if K rises, the range of parameters for which the DM prefers both committee
members to collect soft information shrinks;
ii) if the DM prefers the committee members collecting soft information to collect-
ing hard information, he selects min ai ∈ (p, 2p + h), such that the conditions
in Proposition 2 and 4 are satisfied;
iii) if the DM prefers the committee members collecting hard information to col-
lecting soft information, he selects ai such that the conditions in Proposition
1 and 3 are satisfied.
In the introduction, we have discussed three agency problems. First, committee
members should put effort in information collection. Second, committee members
should try to find the proper pieces of information. Third, committee members may
manipulate certain pieces of information. In this section, we have shown that when
the cost of information collection is low the second and the third agency problem
can be solved by appointing members whose preferences are identical to those of
the DM. When the cost are high, solving the first agency problem requires that
preferences outliers are appointed. Clearly this may endanger the solution of the
second and the third agency problem.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a model to gain insight into the role of committees in
collective decision-making processes in a world where agents must be motivated to
collect the proper pieces of information. We have addressed two types of questions:
First, how does the composition of a committee affect final decisions? Second, what
is the optimal composition of a committee from the decision maker’s point of view?
We have shown that the answer to the second question depends to a large extent on
the cost of information collection. If this cost is low, then it is likely that a committee
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will consist of members whose preferences are closely aligned to those of the decision
maker. The advantage of members with similar preferences is that they collect the
pieces of information the decision maker wants them to collect. Moreover, with
similar preferences information will not be manipulated. If the cost of searching is
high, then the committee is composed of members with polarized preferences. The
reason is that outliers have strong incentives to search for information.
Admittedly, our results have been derived from a rather specific model. Some of
the assumptions underlying our model are restrictive but innocuous. Other assump-
tions call for relaxation. Let us first briefly discuss two examples of restrictive, but
rather unimportant assumptions. To reduce straightforward algebra, we have as-
sumed that the decision maker observes whether or not committee members receive
a signal. Relaxing this assumption does not affect our results qualitatively. The
main implication would be that the conditions for communication become more re-
strictive. Uncertainty about whether or not an information provider is informed
jeopardizes communication. Another illustration of the fact that our model is spe-
cific is the way we have specified the two types of uncertainty. Soft information has
been represented by a stochastic term being continuously distributed, while hard
information has been represented by a discrete distribution function. Again our
excuse is simplicity. On the one hand, to address the problem of communication
a discrete distribution function would not suffice. On the other hand, discrete dis-
tribution functions facilitate the illumination of the agency problems in a situation
where agents should collect hard information.
In spite of several restrictive assumptions, our model is still complicated in the
sense that a full description of the equilibria is cumbersome. For this reason, we
have analyzed the conditions for the existence of two prototypes of committees: a
committee consisting of only outliers and a committee consisting of only moderates.
We believe that by focusing on the two prototypes of committees, we have high-
lighted the features that make some types of committees more likely than others.
Of course we are aware that mixed committees, for example a committee composed
of one moderate and one outlier, may exist. Such a case is discussed in Appendix
A. The analysis of that case confirms our conjecture that analyzing all cases would
not yield new insights.
Less innocent are our assumptions about the institutional setting and the size
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of the committee. Our model revolves around one decision maker who can appoint
committee members. Although one could think of this decision maker as the median
floor member in Congress, it is important to realize that political institutions are
more complex. We have ignored the role political parties and the president play
in the composition of committees. Concerning the size of the committee, we have
simply assumed that a committee consists of two members even though it may be
optimal to create a committee consisting of more members. We leave the question
on the optimal size of the committee for future research. However, whatever the
size of the committee, the mechanism illuminated by this paper will also be relevant
when the size of the committee is endogenous. As members must be motivated
to collect the proper pieces of information, the cost of collecting information, the
magnitudes of the various types of uncertainty, and the members’ preferences will
remain important.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Hard and soft information
In this appendix, we show the conditions for an equilibrium in which agent 1
selects L1 = µ and agent 2 selects L2 = θB.
Proposition 7 Suppose p ∈ (1
2
(a1−h)+ 14z, 12(a1+h)− 14z], p ≤ 12(a1+a2), h > 12z
and p ≤ −1
2
z. Furthermore, suppose π
4h
£
(h+ a1)
2 + 1
4
z
¤ ≥ K, π
2h
£
1
4
z2 + a2
¤ ≥ K
and 1
4
z2 ≥ (1 − π)(h + a2). Then an equilibrium exists in which the strategies
are defined as follows: (i) agent 1 examines µ; he sends m1 = 0 if he has not
received a signal; he sends m1 = Y1 if he has inferred that θB = 0 and has found
si > −ai + 12z; he sends m1 = Y1 if he has observed that θB = z and has found
si > −ai − 12z; he sends mi = Ni in all other cases; (ii) agent 2 examines θB
and reports information, if found (iii) the DM chooses X = 1 if he has received
(Y1, 0), (Y1, z) and chooses X = 0 otherwise. The posterior beliefs are given by:
E(µ | Y1, 0) = 12(h − a1 + 12z); E(µ | Y1, z) = 12(h − a1 − 12z); E(µ | N1, 0) =
−1
2
(h + a1 − 12z); E (µ | N1, z) = −12
¡
h+ a1 +
1
2
z
¢
; E (µ | 0, 0) = E (µ | 0, z) = 0
and Pr(θB = 0 |not report θB = z) = 1.
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Proof. The proof is given in four steps.
1. The posterior beliefs follow directly from the strategies of the agents.
2. Consider agent 1’s strategy. The DM’s strategy implies that if agent 1 has
received a signal, his recommendation is decisive. Before a recommendation is
made, agent 1 observes the message of agent 2 and infers the value of θB. If
m2 = 0 then agent 1 recommends Y1 if si > −ai+ 12z and N1 if si ≤ −ai+ 12z.
Ifm2 = z then agent 1 recommends Y1 if si > −ai− 12z andN1 if si ≤ −ai− 12z.
Agent 1 selects L1 = µ if he prefers L1 = µ to L1 = 0, to L1 = θA, and to
L1 = θB. Agent 1 prefers selecting L1 = µ to selecting L1 = 0 if:
1
2
π
·
h+ a1 − 12z
2h
¸ ·
a1 +
1
2
(h− a1)− 1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
π
·
h+ a1 +
1
2
z
2h
¸ ·
a1 +
1
2
(h− a1) + 1
4
z
¸
−K ≥ 0, (A1)
which reduces to π
4h
£
(h+ a1)
2 + 1
4
z
¤ ≥ K. Note that since p ≤ −1
2
z and h >
1
2
z, the DM never selects X = 1 if no recommendation is made. Consequently,
agent 1 has no incentive to select L1 = θA or to select L1 = θB if (A1) is
satisfied.
3. Consider agent 2’s strategy. Although the DM always follows the recommen-
dation of agent 1, there is an incentive for agent 2 to search. This is because
agent 2 can affect the recommendation of agent 1 by searching for hard evi-
dence. Agent 2 selects L2 = θB if he prefers L2 = θB to L2 = 0, to L2 = µ and
to L2 = θA. Agent 2 prefers selecting L2 = θB to selecting L2 = 0 if:
1
2
π
·
h+ a1 − 12z
2h
¸ ·
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1)− 1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
π
·
h+ a1 +
1
2
z
2h
¸ ·
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1) + 1
4
z
¸
−K
≥ π
·
h+ a1 − 12z
2h
¸ ·
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1) + 1
4
z
¸
,
which reduces to π
2h
£
1
4
z2 + a2
¤ ≥ K. After some straightforward algebra, we
can show that agent 2 prefers L2 = θB to L2 = µ if 14z
2 ≥ (1 − π)(h + a2)2.
Note that this condition is always satisfied if π = 1. If agent 1 receives a
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informative signal s1 = µ with certainty then there is no use for agent 2 to
select L2 = µ. Agent 2 prefers L2 = θB to L2 = θA if 2(a2−a1)+z ≥ 0. Using
a2 ≥ a1 this condition is always satisfied. Note that if the incentive constraints
are satisfied, then agent 2 reports information if found.
4. Using the posterior beliefs, it is easy to verify that, given p ∈ (1
2
(a1 − h) +
1
4
z, 1
2
(a1 + h) − 14z] and p ≤ −12z, the DM prefers X = 1 if he has received
(Y1, 0), (Y1, z) and chooses X = 0 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. We have to derive the conditions for communication if an agent deviates
from an equilibrium in which L1 = θA and L2 = θB by collecting soft information.
First note that agent j speaks after agent i if Lj = µ and Li = θA (Li = θB).
Suppose mi = −z (mi = 0). Then agent j recommends X = 1 if sj > 12z − aj.
Given h > 1
2
z, the posterior beliefs are given by E(µ | mj = Y,mi = −z (mi =
0)) = 1
2
(h + 1
2
z − aj) and E(µ | mj = N,mi = −z (mi = 0)) = −12(h − 12z + aj).
The DM follows agent j’s recommendation if p − 1
2
z + 1
2
(h + 1
2
z − aj) > 0 and
p− 1
2
z− 1
2
(h− 1
2
z+aj) ≤ 0. The latter condition is always satisfied since p < 0. Hence,
in case mi = −z (mi = 0), the DM ignores agent j’s advice if p /∈ (12(aj−h)+ 14z, 0).
Suppose mi = 0 (mi = z). Then agent j recommends X = 1 if sj > −12z − aj.
Given h > 1
2
z, the posterior beliefs are given by E(µ | mj = Y,mi = 0 (mi =
z)) = 1
2
(h − 1
2
z − aj) and E(µ | mj = N,mi = 0 (mi = z)) = −12(h + 12z + aj).
The DM follows agent j’s recommendation if p + 1
2
z + 1
2
(h − 1
2
z − aj) > 0 and
p+ 1
2
z− 1
2
(h+ 1
2
z + aj) ≤ 0. Hence, in case mi = 0 (mi = z), the DM ignores agent
j’s advice if p /∈ (1
2
(aj − h)− 14z, 12(aj + h)− 14z].
Appendix B: Hard information
In this Appendix, we show under what conditions L1 = θA and L2 = θB are
selected rather than Lj = µ. From Lemma 1 we know that the conditions for
communication depend on the availability of hard evidence. As a consequence, the
incentive to deviate by collecting soft information depends on the conditions in
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Lemma 1. Four cases can be distinguished. In each case, agent j refers to the agent
who considers to collect soft information and agent i refers to the agent who collects
hard information. The second case is described in Proposition 3.
i) No communication is possible, p /∈ (1
2
(aj − h) + 14z, 0) and p /∈ (12(aj − h) −
1
4
z, 1
2
(aj + h)− 14z]. Then neither agent has an incentive to collect soft infor-
mation.
ii) Full communication, p ∈ (1
2
(aj − h) + 14z, 0) and p ∈ (12(aj − h) − 14z, 12(aj +
h)− 1
4
z]. Hence, p ∈ (1
2
(aj − h) + 14z, 12(aj + h)− 14z]. The implication is that
the DM follows a recommendation of agent j irrespective of the hard evidence
presented by agent i. The following condition shows when agent 1 prefers
selecting L1 = θA to selecting L1 = µ, given that L2 = θB,
1
4
(a1 + z)−K ≥ 1
2
π
·
h− 1
2
z + a1
2h
¸ ·
1
2
(h+ a1)− 1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
π
·
h+ 1
2
z + a1
2h
¸ ·
1
2
(h+ a1) +
1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
(1− π)
µ
a1 +
1
2
z
¶
−K, (A2)
implying (a1 + z) ≥ πh
£
(h+ a1)
2 + 1
4
z2
¤
+ 2(1 − π)(a1 + 12z). Similarly, we
can show that agent 2 has no incentive to select L2 = µ if (a2 + z) ≥
π
h
£
(h+ a2)
2 + 1
4
z2
¤
.
iii) Partial communication, p /∈ (1
2
(aj−h)+ 14z, 0) and p ∈ (12(aj −h)− 14z, 12(aj +
h) − 1
4
z]. Hence, p ∈ (1
2
(aj − h)− 14z, 12(aj − h) + 14z] which implies that the
DM follows Y1 only if m2 = z. The following condition shows when agent 1
prefers selecting L1 = θA to selecting L1 = µ, given that L2 = θB,
1
4
(a1 + z)−K ≥ 1
2
π
·
h+ 1
2
z + a1
2h
¸ ·
1
2
(h+ a1) +
1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
(1− π)
µ
a1 +
1
2
z
¶
−K,
(A3)
implying (a1+ z) ≥ 12 πh
¡
h+ a1 +
1
2
z
¢2
+2(1−π)(a1+ 12z). Note that X = 1 is
selected if m2 = z and agent 1 has received no signal since the DM infers from
m1 = 0 that θA = 0. It is easy to show that (A3) is less restrictive than (A2).
This is because the DM does not always follow the recommendation of agent
1 and therefore the benefits of collecting soft information are lower. Along
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the same line, we can show that agent 2 has no incentive to select L2 = µ if
(a2 + z) ≥ 12 πh(h+ a2 + 12z)2.
iv) Partial communication, p ∈ (1
2
(aj−h)+ 14z, 0) and p /∈ (12(aj −h)− 14z, 12(aj +
h)− 1
4
z]. Hence, p ∈ (1
2
(aj + h)− 14z, 0) which implies that the DM follows N1
only if m2 = 0. Condition (A4) shows when agent 1 prefers selecting L1 = θA
to selecting L1 = µ, given that L2 = θB,
1
4
(a1 + z)−K ≥ 1
2
π
·
h− 1
2
z + a1
2h
¸ ·
1
2
(h+ a1)− 1
4
z
¸
+
1
2
µ
a1 +
1
2
z
¶
−K,
(A4)
implying (a1 + z) ≥ 12 πh
¡
h+ a1 − 12z
¢2
+ 2(a1 +
1
2
z). For the same reason
as in iii), condition (A4) is less restrictive than condition (A2). Along the
same line, we can show that agent 2 has no incentive to select L2 = µ if
(a2 + z) ≥ 12 πh(h+ a2 − 12z)2 + 2π(a2 + 12z).
Appendix C: Soft information.
In this appendix, we show under what conditions both agents select Li = µ rather
than Li = θA or Li = θB. As in Appendix B, the incentive to deviate depends on the
possibility of communication. However, now we consider an equilibrium in which
both agents select Li = µ. Now, the DM infers from mi = 0 that agent i received
no signal. This implies that the DM selects X = 0 if p ≤ −1
2
z and selects X = 1
if p > −1
2
z when mi = 0 and mj = z. In the remaining part of this appendix, we
show the conditions for which agents prefer collecting soft information to collecting
hard information. On the basis of the conditions in Lemma 1, we can distinguish
three cases. In each case we show four incentive constraints; 1) when agent 1 prefers
selecting L1 = µ to L1 = θA, 2) when agent 1 prefers selecting L1 = µ to L1 = θB,
3) when agent 2 prefers selecting L2 = µ to L2 = θA, and 4) when agent 2 prefers
selecting L2 = µ to L2 = θB.
i) Suppose p ∈ (1
2
(aj − h) + 14z,−12z]. The incentive constraints are:
1. (1− π) (h+ a1)2 + π (a2 − a1)2 ≥ 12z
¡
a2 − a1 + 14z
¢
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2. (1− π) (h+ a1)2 + π (a2 − a1)2 ≥ 12z
£− (a2 − a1) + 14z¤
3. (1− π) (h+ a2)2 ≥ 12z
£− (a2 − a1) + 14z¤
4. (1− π) (h+ a2)2 ≥ 12z
¡
a2 − a1 + 14z
¢
.
Clearly, the second and the third constraint are redundant. The first and the
fourth constraint are mentioned in Proposition 4. Now suppose p > −1
2
z. The
implication is that X = 1 is selected if mi = z and mj = 0. As a consequence, the
RHS of constraint 2 increases with 2h
¡
1−π
π
¢
(a1 +
1
2
z) and the RHS of constraint 4
increases with 2h
¡
1−π
π
¢
(a2 +
1
2
z).
ii) Suppose p ∈ (1
2
(aj − h) − 14z, 12(aj − h) + 14z] and p ≤ −12z. The incentive
constraints are:
1. (h+ a1)
2 + (1− 2π)(h+ a2)
£
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¤ ≥ (h+ a2)12z
2. (h+ a1)2 + 12z(a2 − a1 + 14z) ≥ 2π(h+ a2)
£
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¤
3. (h+ a1)
£
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1)− 12z
¤
+ (1− π)(h+ a2)2 ≥ 0
4. (1− π)(h+ a2)2 ≥ 12z(a2 − a1 + 14z).
Now, suppose p > −1
2
z. As in i), the RHS of constraint 2 increases with
2h
¡
1−π
π
¢
(a1 +
1
2
z) and the RHS of constraint 4 with 2h
¡
1−π
π
¢
(a2 +
1
2
z).
iii) Suppose p ∈ (1
2
(aj + h) − 14z, 0). As a consequence, p > −12z. The incentive
constraints are:
1. (h+ a1)
2 − 2π(h+ a2)
£
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¤ ≥ 1
2
z(a2 − a1 + 14z)
2. π (h+ a1)
2 − (1− π)π(h+ a2)
£
a1 +
1
2
(h− a2)
¤ ≥ −1
2
z(h+ a2) + h(a1 +
1
2
z)
3. (h+ a1)
£
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1)− 12z
¤
+ (1− π)π (h+ a2)2 ≥ 0
4. π (h+ a1)
£
a2 +
1
2
(h− a1) + 12z
¤
+ (1− π)π(h+ a2)2 ≥ 2h(a2 + 12z).
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We have to proof that ai = p yields at least the same payoff for the DM
as ai 6= p if K < 18z, p ∈ (4K − z,−4K] and K ≤ 14hπ (1− π) (h+ p)2. First, note
that if a = p, then members collect the pieces of information the DM wants to be
collected. We focus on two cases; i) the DM wants both pieces of hard information
to be collected, and ii) the DM wants both members to collect soft information.
i) The DM yields an expected payoff of 1
4
(z + p) in case L1 = θA and L2 = θB.
This payoff is independent of a1 and a2. Two members with predisposition
ai = p have an incentive to collect both pieces of hard information if ai ≤ −4K
and if ai > 4K − z. This requires that K < 18z and p ∈ (4K − z,−4K].
ii) The DM yields an expected payoff of
π
·
h+ ai
2h
¸ ·
p+
1
2
(h− ai)
¸
+ (1− π)π
·
h+ aj
2h
¸ ·
p+
1
2
(h− aj)
¸
. (A5)
in case Li = µ and Lj = µ. Maximizing (A5) towards ai and aj gives ∂∂ai =
π
2h
(p − ai) = 0 and ∂∂aj =
π(1−π)
2h
(p − aj) = 0. Hence, the expected payoff
for the DM in case soft information is collected is maximized if p = ai = aj.
Remains to show when members alike the DM have an incentive to collect
soft information. Proposition 2 shows the incentive constraints for which both
agents select Li = µ rather than Li = 0. Inserting a = p gives that K ≤
1
4h
π (1− π) (h+ p)2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 5 we know that if K ≥ 1
8
z and K >
1
4h
π (1− π) (h + p)2 then agents with a = p do not collect information. Hence, the
DM has to appoint two agents with ai 6= p. The remaining part of the proof is
divided into three parts, as in Proposition 6.
i) The DM prefers both members to collect soft information if the expression in
(A5) is higher than 1
4
(z+p). If the DMprefers the collection of soft information,
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then he should appoint two members with a > p since the costs are high. It
is easy to show that the expected payoff for the DM decreases with 1
4h
(a− p)2
if a > p rather than if a = p. An increase in a decreases the expected payoff
for the DM. From the incentive constraints in Proposition 2, we know that a
should rise if K increases. Hence, the DM prefers both members to collect soft
information for a smaller range of parameters if K increases.
ii) In i) we have seen that the DM prefers selecting ai as close as possible to p
to maximize the expected payoff in case soft information is collected. The
conditions in Proposition 2 and 4 show when both members select Li = µ
given that h > 0 and z > 0. The condition for communication requires that
ai < 2p+ h.
iii) This follows simply from the fact that the conditions in Proposition 1 and 3
show when L1 = θA and L2 = θB are selected given that h > 0 and z > 0.
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